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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to analyze briefly some of the most important dimensions
that shape the political panorama of the Autonomous Community of the Basque
Country (A.C.B.C.).
My purpose is to limit myself to some aspects relating to the dynamics of the
relationship among parties and their changing strategies from one of the main
axes of basque political culture that is nationalism, and the elements of identity,
social tensions, political differentiation and breakdowns of the proceeding
consensus (quiebras del consenso procedimental), that it involved in the Basque
Country as well.
1.1. The complexity of basque political scene
I am not going to talk about questions on which some of my colleagues have
already done research work, relating to electoral behaviour, the analysis of party
system or the political culture rulers. I am going to highlight briefly just that the
basque party system, according to what Sartori (1980: 165 and following) says, is
pluralist polarized (Llera, 1993 and 1994; Linz, 1986, Gunther, Sani and Shabad,
1986, 312 and following, etc.).
In the ACBC there is a high fragmentation with an average of seven
outstanding parliamentary parties, serious social tensions and a great ideological
distance, confrontation between identities and symbolic conflict, as well as an
antisystem party (Herri Batasuna). I should highlight/underline that, relating to the
militants and the location of the electorate, there is and important difference
among provinces, which involves a different correlation of forces in every
Historical Jurisdiction1. Therefore, we could say that the basque political scene is
very complex, even more complex if we take into account some dimensions of the
social and political life such as the existence of a terrorist organisation and some
others that help  to become more difficult the construction of an articulated society
and the creation, and mainly assumption of a common political project that
contributes to the appearance of a basic consensus of the society regardless of
the practical needs of government.
It is quite known that one of the historical and political features of the Basque
Country alluded by J.J. Linz (1986) and F.J. LLera (1993) and some others, is the
existence of differences among provinces that touch upon party system and
electoral behaviour and that therefore, generate a different correlation of forces in
each province.
1.2. Provincial phenomenons and the breaking up of ACBC
The problematic relationship among the provinces has an unquestionable
historical basis: The different positions during civil war, the Historical Jurisdiction
Law (HJL)2, the confrontation among provinces in different fields such as, for
example, the economic field, infrastructures field, development and industrial
plans (chambers of commerce, airports, among provincial governments3, etc.)
and some others that are more symbolic.
The feeling of exclusion that own political, economic artistic and other
sectors -which have an important influence on provinces- generates serious
tensions from which get benefit not only those parties settled down in the
provinces (Unidad Alavesa, Unidad Vizcaína, Iniciativa Ciudadana Vasca), but
the respective scissions that arise into the nationalist parties as well, which notice
how their importance becomes limited and located at the sectors named before.
The examples of Eusko Alkartasuna and the already extinguished Euskal Ezkerra
and Euskadiko Ezkerra, and even the trend towards the becoming of Gipuzkoa
the basic space of HB, are very significative and let us understand this dynamic.
I may use as an explanation, among some others, the one that J.R. Recalde
gave (1982: 43) and the following) about the difference and consequences of the
«quick» and «slow» national constructions... The cultural basque nationalism has
not been something homogeneous and, however, it tries to nazionalizate the
whole territory defined from its ideology, which takes it to contradictory strategies
and internal crisis. The construction of the Basque Country has happened
through a «quick» process, so the ideological chore of national programming
acentuates he inventive element. It is about creating a nation from where there
was not a political base before. On the oppositte to the slow processes, in which
formally autonomous political institutions have made up along the centuries (431
and following). This is the reason why the centrifugal trends reproduce
themselves using different ideological, cultural, localist and other kind of
arguments.
1.3. The axes of ideological distance. Violence and Nationalism. Identitary
longing
In the basque society there are three superposed axes of analysis. The first
two axes correspond with the two main dimensions of ideological distance
(left/right, nationalism-non nationalism) and the third one places sets the approval
or disapproval of ETA’s violence in a dichotomized perception.
The nationalism is one of the central axes of basque political culture, which is
essential to undertake the analysis of political reality that superposes itself,
weakens and, even sometimes fades away the other two analytic dimensions:
with regard to the first one because, except for some tactical integrating
proposals (that we are going to analyze later) polarizes society around two
sectors, dramatizing political life and impregnating with breaks daily life.
On the other hand the insertion of ETA’s terrorism in a nationalist «political
conflict» makes the importance given to the concept of «basque contentions»
persist. With regard to this Ardanza said:
... in the nationalist ideology was very difficult to  make a difference clearly,
the only reasonable way of classify, from the democratic point of view seemed to
lie in proclaiming a clear distance (...) concerning to the means, assuming,
however, the identity in the ends (1992b:10).
This has had serious consequences(...): the inmediate percepcion that
violence has an authentic political status; the fact that nationalist parties could not
withdraw from he suspicion of their excessive coexistence with  violents in order to
profit end and, finally, the dividing line between democrats and violents could not
prevail over the one that divided, and still divides, nationalists and non-nationalist,
which weakened, at the same time, and notably, the efficacy that political action
opposite to the terrorism needed  (1992b:10-11).
The coincidence with valuable ends is something that many times has been
supported by different analysts  (Aranzadi, 1981, 1994; Mata, 1993; Ibarra, 1987),
it is the one that has made -as we will see- PNV and EA focus on the «marxist»
component of some of the collectives that make up the MLNV (for example KAS)
and that nowadays, they seem to lead the ideological process that «Oldartzen»
(attacking, manling, hiting, touching strongly) alludes to, trying to take away the
radical movement from its nationalist condition and to place it within the limits of
the ideological axis left/right.
The superiority of the nationalist dimension in the Basque Country imposes,
at the same time, a trend towards the projection of politics to the field of the
values, placed in the conflict of symbolic universe (Cohen, 1985: 98 and
following; Zulaika, 1990), which makes political debate become a discussion on
«absolutes». As Ardanza recognized (1992b: 9):
...about abstract categories more than about concrete realities: People
opposite to citizens, legitimacy opposite to opportunity, reason opposite to
coexistence, freedom opposite to liberties, collective law opposite to majority of
wills... To this effect the progressive adaptation of society to the common
democratic habits has contributed to the process of clarification enormously.
On the other hand, we must not forget that not much more than a year ago,
the half part of the citizens considered themselves as nationalist (See Table 1).
And that more than a third part of those consider that basque and spanish
identities are incompatible (Table 2).
As Aranzadi says:
ETA's violence arises and developes as a selfaffirmative of basque
nationalist community auhentic ritual...it is not a reaction against the repression of
a lasting and oppressed identity, the violence is the expression of the aspiration
to reach it, equally as in the «abertzalismo radical» (explicar) of those
maladjusted inmigrants there is not an ethnic identity but a will to assume it.
Violence is the proclamation of that will (1994: 218-214).
The «identitary will» involves different definitions of the concept of «basque»,
which contribute to create different social breakdowns when they become clear
references of adhesion in the nationalist/non nationalist codes and even as an
element that makes the difference among parties' clients (Table 3).
Close to the majority condition of the «will to be basque», a close condition
for the nationalist electorate, which make people defend everything considered as
basque, fighting, learning basque, voting for nationalist parties, etc., we can find
that in HB abound those who think that the necessary condition to be basque is to
«defend basque nation» (85%), «speaking Euskera» is necessary for those who
vote for HB in a 53%, and for the 44% of the voters for EA and rejected by the
68% and the 71% of the electors for PSOE and PP respectively.
This supposes a reinforcement of subjective reasons at the expense of
primordial ones (Llera, 1994: 83), which must not make us forget that basic
characteristics underlie in the conditions «of will» and that they are subject to the
adquisition of some of these characteristics: «euskera» (basque language), «the
'vasquización' of surnames» (process of translating into basque an spanish
surname), etc., through the ways of the vote, the action, the learning process or
the assumption of own models of nationalism (Mata, 1993).
2. THE CONSENSUS. POLITICAL BREAKDOWNS AND SOCIAL PROCESSES
2.1. Types of consensus
If democracy means sharing, linking, and, as Sartori (1988: 121 and
following) showed, based on Easton, those objects that are going to be shared
will be linked to the basic level of community about the fact that a concrete
society has as a whole the same values and ends, from the point of view of the
political society.
This is not a necessary condition for democracy, but if it does not exist, we
will have an heterogeneous and fragmented political culture (Almond) and
democracy will run as a weak democracy and with difficulties. It is a helping
condition.
The second type is the proceeding consensus which establishes those rules
called game rules (the processes that control the exercise of power) and, mainly,
how should conflicts be solved. In democracy the rule is the one of majority. If it
does not share this rule, it is the way towards the conflict and civil war. There is
not democracy.
The third type will be the political one, about political action of governments.
Dissension and opposition as elements that characterize democracy.
2.2. The debate between parties and political conflict. The political
impregnation of daily life. The spiral of silence
If we analyze the reality of the Basque Country, we must aim at some
breakdowns in the different consensuses.
Certainly, some authors have highlighted the reinforcement of a society of
consensus, in which social and political privatisation phenomenons, sometimes
apathy and demobilisation, involve a «secularisation» of the political
confrontation, more dependent on pragmatic questions and on the resolution of
daily problems than on the ups and downs of the debate among parties. This
same analysis is the one that Ardanza made:
The situation of serious disagreement with the basic questions of the Country
(statutory consensus, territorial cohesion, language and culture and the front
against violence) are located more on the plane of the strictly partidary debate
among political representatives than in the bosom of society (...) Basic
disagreements and the excessive tension that relationships among parties suffer
from, could finish getting in wide sectors of the social body that would involve in
controversies that are not of their own  (1992a: 22-23).
This call to limit the conflict to the field of the parties and to call consensus
was considered necessary because a wide demand requires respecting the basic
consensus of the country, even extending the space of shared values, on which
security and the whole society’s confidence must settle and limit the political
debate to the confrontation of different solutions given to the problems that the
society suffers from (1992a: 23).
However, I think that now that five years have passed since these words
were said, a basic consensus, explicitly assumed and expressed, has not been
reached by this society. Political groups have not been interested in agreeing
about some basic elements, on which construct, and even more, respect game
rules and the procedure to solve the conflicts.
The fears of exclusion that some feel and the disrespect to the differences
shown by others, the systematic allusions to the past, territorial tensions, almost
endemic violence, hatred against the adversary, the conviction that «the more
you fight, the more you represent», and at last, that the fact that any side of the
debate about institutional policies is directly projected to the breakdown of basic
and proceeding consensuses, let us know that the formation of government
coalitions is an important fact but it does not have a serious effect on a major
integration of political life.
With regard to the statute and citizenship, to territorial cohesion and to the
basque and culture are liable to a systematic debate and questioning. The labour
of the leaders of political parties and even the «Lehendakari» have helped to it.
In concrete situations of daily life any observer can realize it: looking at the
friend groups, reading the letters written to the editors of the newspapers, paying
attention to those opinions of local social gatherings, analyzing textbooks and
debates about teaching system. Or we go into the conflict or we avoid it assigning
taboo attributes. From this point of view we should highlight that even though the
situation is a little different in the cities, nowadays we can consider -in small
measure- that the spiral of silence goes on running (Noelle-Neumann). As we can
observe in the Tables 4, 5 and 6.
And everything without thinking of the fear for participating in politics (mainly
with regard to some options), in which, sometimes, people feel the patent threat
of violence.
This general panorama make us propose ourselves to do research work on
the relationships among political parties of the Basque Autonomous Community,
and regardless of parlamentary agreements or disagreements, it is necessary to
introduce inter and intrapartisan debates that look for the suitable strategies to
shape a very complex electoral and social space and to get the implementation of
their ideas (conceptions according to the nationalist axis through the concrete
politics that the reality of the country is looking for).
In this second heading we are going to talk about two aspects that I think
they are basic in order to understand the dynamic of partisan strategies:
Resetting/mending the nationalist space and struggling for the «non-nationalist»
reference.
3. THE RESETING OF THE NATIONALIST SPACE
3.1. PNV: From Arriaga's spirit to Elkarri's Conference for peace
As J.C. Viloria (1995: 79) says, the «quiet nationalism» (X. Aierdi, 1989),
derived from the model hold by the Arriaga's spirit, had involved an historical
change about the conception that PNV had of the Basque Country and about the
implicit identification that could be observed in its discourse, putting on the same
level the one that is basque and the nationalist and the PNV; building a country
as it wants to and a made-to-measure project (Historic Jurisdictions, Historic
Jurisdictions Law; EITB (Basque radio and television); Language normalization
Law, etc.) offering no chances to the autonomy of the government in order to
achieve consensuses. They look as they were «batzokizing» the country using
their headquarters and their social systems as clientelism sources.
The discourse of the Arriaga rejected this implicit dynamic about its political
culture, partly in order to make suitable its discourse to the changes that will
happen in the basque society, but surely more intending to take over an electoral
and sociological space of «vasquistas» sectors or simply the one of the moderate
right who felt that they had been excluded. That explicit recognition of all of the
basque were non nationalist and the fact that if Euskadi became nationalist it
would become because of perssuasion, supposed an intention to reach
consensus on a basic «basquism» which had to accept concrete definitions and
values of the one that it is basque from nationalism's point of view.
The overcoming of exclusive temptations by the democratic nationalism. The
trend to identify the nationalist with the basque has had the perverse effect which
is that non-nationalists mistook the basque with the nationalist, not letting them
accept it as something of their own. The patrimonial sense of nationalism has had
a retarding effect on the integration process, and it even has been used by the
reticent ones as an alibi not to join it (Ardanza, 1993: 32).
However, in 1997 we can realize that there is a very different strategic way.
Some, as J.C. Viloria (1995: 81 and the following) used to say that the breakdown
with Arriaga's spirit was mentioned for the first time in 1993 as a part of the
conference that X. Arzallus addressed at Galtzaundi forum/meeting and alluding
to the «basque blood», to those from «outside», etc., and, mainly, talking about
the unity of «abertzales» and the advance towards «the ownstatus» as it had
happened in Slovenia and in the Baltic Countries.
This new strategic design, that is taking shape, acquires/obtains all its
dynamic in the conversations for the peace held by Elkarri and, recently, in the
document about pacification made by the PNV.
The way called Egibar way (or Ollora way)4 contains these following two
foundations:
1. The recognicement/acknowledgement or the politic nature of the conflict
held by ETA and the MLNV and the solution of this one through the dialogue and
negotiation from politics and giving/offering political solutions without imposing
impossible conditions.
2. The project of national construction based on the integration and
unification of the fragmented basque national conscience. The crossbreeding (as
the respect to the minorities that do not support the project), political sovereing
transcending the Estatute (self-determination) and the new values (Ollora: 1995,
91).
As P. Unzueta said, in the turn towards dialogue with the radical movement
made by the PNV, this party considered that «the treatment of self-determination
was the key position of pacification» and that this one might «involve how right
the other one is and put together the model of «abertzale» left and the Pact of
Ajuria Enea (1996: 403).
This tactical movement has involved that the spirit of the Arriaga of 1988 in
the field of the solutions given to the problem of violence were put away, I mean,
from the previous repudiation towards the «basque contentious» denomination
that Ardanza supported because of its manipulator/condition, and from his
purpose of showing ETA’s violence out of the «territories» of nationalism and
political field.
It has gone from the plan to finish with violence: a) Not to political
negotiation; b) Going deeply into the legitimacy of the system and c) Improving
the efficacy of the system (1992b: 10-20), to the document about pacification of
1997 made by the PNV, in which it aims explicitly, in its first point/question/matter,
at the fact that ETA is the non-democratic expression of the basque contentious
and even, in its ninth point that:
Taking into account that the Pact of Ajuria Enea, instead of having been
developed as an authentic offer towards negotiation, has been used  -by
somebody- for shaping and projecting a non-terrorist front... If it really wants to
help to generate active dynamics of pacification needs a revitalisation and a new
updated formulation that make possible to create an enlargement/amplification in
the future (1997: 16).
In this process there are some factors that can be concreted in the following:
1st. The design of the postnationalist strategy of PSOE and, later, the
resurgence/revival of PP and IU, and the maintenance/support of EA and HB as
well.
2nd. The accusations/charges of «españolismo» (pro-spanish),
«vendepatrias» (sic: those who sell their country), etc., that come from the setting
of the MLNV.
3rd. The impossibility to get a balance between pragmatism and symbolism;
values and ends; management and representation.
4th. The danger of promoting and identitary crisis among its members or
contributing to weaken/debilitate the brightness/clarity of its discourse, leading to
internal tensions.
5th. The little electoral profitability got.
6th. Its inability/incapacity to articulate territorial and politically the country,
with patent differences in the implantation and increase of provincial tensions.
7th. The stagnant/paralysed support of the practices of social pressure at the
«batzokis» with an appearance of clientelism and an increasing breakdown of the
spiral of silence, mainly in those cities/towns that have suffered from the lost of
social control.
J.C. Viloria (1995: 81 and following) says that:
... the positions of the PNV ran up against the trenches, the abstention or...
because it was not sufficiently valued the phenomenon of violence, nor the deep
plurality of basque society, ... at the same time as the strong polarization of HB
and EA forced it to look permanently at that direction while the charismatic figure
of Arzallus, although it has the cohesion, it has also been a ballast for the
reunification and a demotivating factor for a section of the potential voters...
reflecting itself the failure about the determination of assimilating non-nationalists
to the national project of the PNV.
This situation has probably involved that the tensions in the party have
arisen/emerged and have misplaced some sectors of voters that, further from the
fidelity owed «to the party», make the relationship between the present strategy
of pacification and the perception that there are systematic violent attacks on the
PNV a problem. It is obvious that the positions in which Atutxa and other
members of the PNV move do not fit properly into the position mentioned. As an
example of this let us read the following:
The spirit of the Arriaga is alive but we should not live it fall asleep. It is a
plant that should be watered everyday... I would never accept being given that
right (of selfdetermination) by the way of imposition and violence... inside the
party everyone plays his part, because of that is good that we change
periodically, I may be wrong and the following may came and settle another
style... Even if there is much understanding, many meetings, much of crossing
each other messages with LAB, HB and I do not know who and my party, and I
will carry on with the mood of the crime persecution... In order to open dialogue
with ETA: 10th point of the Pact of Ajuria Enea (If they declare the truce before)
(Atutxa, 1996: 20-21).
On the other hand, we should underline that in PNV’s leadership -with that
differentiation Party-government that it also have happened in other parties- is the
party who determines completely the structures and policies of the government,
conceding a minimum manoeuvring margin to its people in authority in order to
get the necessary consensuses. The appearance of weakness of the governors
and they total dependence on the EBB -mainly on Arzallus- (maybe, excepting
the case of Atutxa) from Garaikoetxea, we should remark what J. Juaristi defines
as «the divorce between PNV and the basque intellectuals» in every field:
The divorce between PNV and the prestigious basque intellectuals is
obvious/evident/clear... Most of the «euskericos» (those who write in Euskera)
writers are completely foreign, and even hostile, to it and we had better not talk
about the basque writers that write in Castilian. Neither in institutions, nor in
cultural enterprises, university... None of the titans of basque culture, except for L.
Mitxelena, who finished his days out of the party, nor prestigious historians, not
even a philosopher of recognised worth, not even a scientific who have made
stand out in his field are members of the party...and I would say that it is
harmful/damaging to the cultural normalisation of the Country (1995: 48 and
following).
Certainly, these problems about political leadership and expression towards
outside, mainly in the mass media and other expression ways, weaken the
impregnation of its discourse in a rationalised way, further from the fidelity to the
party and, mainly, the possibility to go beyond the limits of its proposals towards
other that generate new values, further from the basic principles of the
nationalism and daily pragmatism. It is quite right that the symbols, language and
the control of EITB have been important vehicles for the normalised,  assumption
of concrete key questions of the basque (de lo vasco), in its nationalist version5,
and also that it seems that nationalism has reached the limit of its potential
voters, taking place some basic decantings/pourings inside the parties and
balancing itself with the changeable loose ends of the «most nationalist» or the
«most right» extremes.
As we have said before, besides, the social and political privatisation
influences strongly, mainly on young people and in urban areas, weaking the
nationalist sociability nets and turning the symbolic premises of conflict into others
that are more pragmatic and realistic. But the most important thing is that the
nationalism has lost its capacity/aptitude for social control and it does not appear
any more as an hegemonic discourse in the basque society.
The proposal of nationalist unification in the basque case has always been
the subject to be retaken for the PNV and, in general and implicitly by all basque
nationalists. The positions held by Elkarri and its strategy of the «third space»
coinciding with the proposals of PNV tending towards opening «common places»
with some sectors of the MLNV (ELA-LAB accord, conferences for peace,
declarations and supports to the regroupment of prisoners, proposals to
«transcend the Estatute» and self-determination, going further from the Pact of
Ajuria Enea, etc.) together with the purpose of forcing solutions to the subject of
violence, criticising the strategy of PP and the supposed stagnation of the Pact of
Ajuria Enea, are also inserted in the intention/purpose of leading again the
nationalist unity and, at the same time, make smaller the political space of EA.
3.2. EA: the struggle for survival
I agree with Castells (1995: 87 and followings) when he says that EA is the
third way which is located between the hegemonic party and the radical one and
that it fills the space that EE and ANV had already filled before.
In addition to an image of deideologization and the permanent
necessity/need for opening out in an space full of political groups, the
secessionist origin of EA and the roots of this origin make this party get a position
in a complex attitude.
It is quite known that the birth of EA is located in a different version about the
way in which shape the Basque Country institutionally (LTH), the alliance policy,
the tensions Party-government, and, the most important thing, reasons about
personal incompatibilities. This fact involved the trauma of political and social split
of the hegemonic nationalism.
With several ups and downs, it is right that, nowadays, the situation of EA
does not seem to be promising, it is politically up the creek between PNV and HB,
with a residual participation in government, with serious internal blocking tensions
(the unionist from Gipuzkoa, the radicals from Bizkaia), leavings of leaders who
are locally important which make this party appoint independent political posts,
«asphyxiated» by mass media and depending on Garaikoetxea totally.
These personal disagreements among leaders, the traumas and dramas that
the scission involved on rank-and-file members and the different version about
the model of institutional joint/articulation will probably be the factors that make
unity more difficult, even though the implicit proposals from the PNV to EA are
constant in the strategic design of the first one, but these proposals can just be
noticed by the rank-and-file members, and never by the party in a formal way.
Trying to bring a relative peace to the democratic nationalist family...and the
party that owns more power, more strength and more social settlement is the one
that has to do it with an open disposition/mood/frame of mind.. There is a sector
of nationalist family that feels that it is orphan and we must give them an answer
(Ardanza, 1994: 19).
3.3. Herri Batasuna: From the «popular unity» to the «socialisation of
suffering»
One of the most important elements that do not let the unity of nationalists go
is violence, mainly because, besides, the framework/network that supports it and
the organisation that practices it have changed to the total breakdown tactic and
with the «paramarxists» ingredients of KAS in the direction of the process.
G. Jáuregui (1995: 38 and following) is right when he says that:
If for a long time PNV has supported an ambiguous position towards ETA,
reflected in the idea of «yes to ends, not to means», until the definitive breakdown
of 1988, is quite right that PNV has always been much more intransigent with the
Marxist fickleness of ETA or of the direction of the movement.
Curiously, as history shows, the trunk of ETA till nowadays has been
characterised with the most radically nationalist branch, while Marxist, trotskyst,
proworkers or other sectors with some type of ideological component of that kind
used to split and leave violence. As it happens with the increase of violence, this
has always corresponded with the degree of nationalist radically that there exists
in ETA.
Many annalists that belong to the PNV have insist on the marxistizing
condition of MLNV, a fact not demonstrated absolutely in the ideological
components of its voters and members, which has make them establish a
separation between leaders and rank-and-file members, among ETA-KAS-HB
through which design a strategy for attracting its voters and show the discourse
about the manipulation of the rank-and-file members of HB by the «direction».
The ideological orthodoxy of a direction is not as complex as the reality of the
«abertzale» left... I cannot think that such a restless movement stays for such a
long time kidnapped (Ardanza, 1992b: 21).
Certainly, from the call to the Popular Unity, going through the «process of
accumulation of forces», to the point of «socialisation of suffering» in which we
are nowadays, derived from Oldartzen report, a long time has passed in which a
tactic change and, probably, of direction of the process, that is quite significant at
the time of making an analysis of its connection with the nationalist dimension,
has been held.
The terrorist outrages against members of PNV and ELA and the systematic
attack against batzokis, leaders and members of the PNV and other parties, etc.,
is a part of the strategy of total breaking-off designed in the report called
«Oldartzen» (1995), which aimed at «the need for struggling for every mean and
in every front» in order to get the aims proposed before.
From the «KAS alternative» it has passed to the «Democratic Alternative»,
that supports the tactic objective of negotiation between ETA and the State in
order to get the self-determination, the territorial integration and the freedom for
the prisoners of ETA.
Although the electoral implantation of HB and the active rank-and-file
members are being restricted more and more to Gipuzkoa and some rural areas
of Bizkaia, and less in Araba, and some towns in Navarra as well, and, despite of
having left the tactic of «attracting» other sectors of basque society in order to
enlarge the forces of MLNV through the strategy of the accumulation of forces
and integration of sectorial struggles (Mata, 1993), or just because of all we have
said, it has happen a centripetal movement in the bosom of MLNV, a call in order
to union, even if it is at the expense of leaving or isolating those who are critics, or
those from which can be noticed some doubt inside he movement.
Through the called «kale borroka», the inflexible direction of KAS and some
concrete actions, but very significative, of ETA, and the reinforcement among the
rank-and-file members of the antidemocratic conviction that the most who fights,
the most who represents, and concrete socializating processes reinforced
indirecly by the isolating-polarizating dinamic, as well, we could say that HB-KAS-
ETA are able to settle in great measure -unless- the political life at the Basque
Country nowadays.
4. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE «NON-NATIONALIST» REFERENCE
4.1. PSOE. From «postnationalism» to the «statutism» of the «left margin»
Probably, the integration of some leaders and significative members that
belonged to Euskadiko Ezkerra in the Partido Socialista de Euskadi, and
Jáuregui’s leadership as well, were determinant elements in the important change
produced in the relationships between PSE and the world of the nationalist
identifying marks. Certainly, the need for turning with regard to the deeply anti-
nationalist tradition of PSE was evident because of this:
-The exhaustion of an electoral basis that used to depend in great measure
on the unequal mobilizating ability of different non-nationalist sectors, who used
to think that PSE was the «reference» of the defence of the «idea of Spain in the
Basque Country».
-The purpose of attracting basquist sectors that did not identify themselves
with the nationalism, unless as it was conceived by the different political groups in
the Basque Country, and with the electoral basis of the old Euskadiko Ezkerra as
well.
-The need for making suitable for the changes that were being held in a
society that had integrated, without traumas, some of the elements (mainly
cultural and of model of political articulation) defended by the positions of
nationalism.
This turn was made concrete on three mainstays: the defence of Statute, the
claim for the pending transferences and the assumption of the process of
«euskaldunización», that were the guide of those positions called
postnationalists, of which M. Onaindía and R. Jáuregui, with other sectors of the
party at Gipuzkoa, were their main mentors.
The transfer of the postnationalist formulation (articulated from a theoric
perspective by J. Juaristi6 -addressed in a conference organised by the «Aula de
Cultura de El Correo»- to the field of the debate and political strategy, involved a
hard reaction of the main leaders of PNV, when they understood that this design
was the beginning of a «frontist» of the non-nationalists which with it was tried to
join those who were not nationalists in order to adopt a position of confrontation
towards basque nationalists. Ardanza made the following analysis:
These days it is being incorporated, joined to others of similar sign as
«national fact» or «national identity», to the language of a party that appears as
«new» and defines itself as «non-nationalist»...they promise more than the
suppression of divisions, the continuity of an old confrontation in which a
nationalism of different sign -Spanish nationalism- disguises itself tactically as
«non-nationalism» in order to combat basque nationalism... (1993a: 31).
If socialists want to be the agglutinants of the antinationalist front again, it
would mean that they bet more and more on a social breakdown, because of the
division of society...serious and irresponsible.
Apart from the fact that the 40% or 60% of the vote in Euskadi were
nationalist, there is a nationalist communion or a collective ownership of
sentiment firmly rooted in the essences of this society...that will bring about
radicalizations also in the other side... (1994: 18 and 19).
This purpose, let us call it «vasquizante», of the PSE had, among other
significative facts, the conference addressed by R. Jáuregui at «Galtzaundi»
forum7. The political debate adquired a great virulence and M. Onaindía, one of
the promoters of the idea, said that:
The problem of the PNV is that the society has assumed the most rationals
claims of nationalism... Ardanza has understood the postnationalism on the
wrong way... the postnationalism just consists on touching upon an evident reality
as it is that the great majority of the basque society has assumed the Statute, we
all agree on the pending transferences and on «euskaldunización»... Insisting on
the split of basque people is not politically operative... it wants to get the voters of
EA... The only division happens between democrats and non-democrats (1994:
12).
However, the failure of the hopes entrusted to the autonomic elections of
1994, with the subsequent problems to negotiate its incorporation into the
Government of Coalition led by the PNV; the strength of the members that came
from «emigration» areas in the internal structure of the party, and the influence of
mayors of the «left margin» and of some leaders that are frenzied antinationalists;
the patent promotion of PP, which threatened with becoming the reference of
«non-nationalists», among others, has made PSE change notoriously in its
strategy, in which «other aspects» have been left -or unless, weakening them in
its discourse-, fitting it to a «statutist» attitude. They were probably convinced of
the fact that the openness made towards «vasquistas» sectors but not «non-
nationalists», not only had not had the results desired, but it even had left
unprotected the flank of historical supports of basque socialism faced with the
threatening presence of PP.
4.2. PP. From the silence to the «reinforcement of the influence».
IU and UA. The impossible autarchy
Since, even before, Alianza Populer were constituted, the sections of leaders
and supporters/adepts who were in the ideological space of the Partido Popular in
the Basque Country have put up with the stigma of the one spanish and,
therefore, of the anti-basque (coming from the nationalist definition), based on its
conservative and even reactionary image, built through its connections with
Franco's régime.
This public image was corresponded with a feeling of isolation and
selfmargination, in a society in which the dominant vision and discourse were the
nationalist and where «being on the right» increased the rejection.
Until the beginning of 90s the adherents to the basque right were the main
«carriers» of the «spiral of silence», they had simply disappeared from the
political life, their discourse were understood as marginal and enemy of any
project related to the political construction of the basque society. The
conservative option was excluded politically and socially (because of its double
condition of «non-nationalist» and «being on the right») in the Basque
Autonomous Community, to the extent of appearing always strongly
infrarepresented in the opinion polls, it remained in hiding, without any expression
and any confirmation of his strength among public opinion. Beforehand it was a
beaten option.
At present, however, the PP occupies enviable positions in the three basque
provincial capitals and has achieved important advances in the whole Basque
Autonomous Community. Even if the party -in the political space shaped by the
left-right and independentism -centralism- dimensions- is still being perceived
basically as a force on the right and centralist, we could say that, in same way, it
has got to add precision to its ideological profile towards the centre-right. The
previous stigma starts to fade away and this image of representant of
«sociological franquism» is only supported invariably by the most radical sections
of nationalism.
The temperation of this image in the Basque Country is mainly due to the
general reorganization that has been held in the spanish right, to the introduction
of a programatic and strtegic turn towards the political centre with its approval and
full integration in the european centre right and the crisis suffered by the PSOE
(Angulo: 1996a, 32).
In the Basque Country this turn has been held, maybe in a clearer way. The
rise of some of the ancient members of UCD, among which J. Mayor Oreja
stands out, the generational renewal that has been held among its
members/militants and people in authority (Iturgaitz, Peón, Barreda and some
others) and, mainly, because new members/militants own some characteristics
that belong to the basque from a nationalist definition (Euskera and others)8, has
involved an important increase of the public expression of its discourse -mainly in
the cities- helping to weaken the social hegemony of the nationalist discourse and
to the increase of some sections of the population who define themselves, not as
agnostic but as atheis with regard to the nationalism.
The posings in order to group a trend that was broken up before and
athomized in different families, involved a bet that the leader Mayor Oreja seems
to have made it true and that involved some guidelines as centrism, autonomism,
moderation and renewal (Angulo, 1996b, 25). The political tactics of the PP in the
Basque Country have always involved two axes: firstly, the purpose to lead the
non-nationalist reference in competition against the PSE, and, secondly, the
purpose to integrate that part of the electorate of the PNV that, being
conservative and simply autonomist, used to vote tactically for the PNV, as a way
to prevent the assumption of left parties to the power.
The ascending trend and the increasing prospects in the electoral field have
involved a definitive social emergence and the opening to a moderate vision in
the ideological field, has allowed an increasing influence on young people,
students, new voters and ancient non-participants, with which it has increased
their capacity of reproduction and a solid and faithful electoral base.
Although the coming up -from the PP of Alava- of UA as a provincial force
involved a serious obstacle for its development, it is truth that the electorate of the
force mentioned before is starting vote again for the PP, leaving UA next to
disappearance (broken by the internal struggles and with a discourse perceived
as unlivable).
Probably, the weakening of the PSOE because of the cases of corruption,
the lost of charisma of F. González, internal tensions; the assassination of G.
Ordoñez by ETA and the importance of moderate leaders, the intents to approach
moderate nationalism (whether in Spain or whether in the Basque Country) and
its victory in the last elections for the Spanish Parliament have helped to this
recovery.
This approach nationalist forces is the result of the Third Project of Basque
Autonomy (Mayor Oreja, 1994: 109-127) and the search for the shape of a new
majority of Government (supposedly PNV-PP)9.
It is evident, however, that the PNV has had an ambiguous relationship with
the PP for years. The shape of accords in Navarra was one of the reasons
(although some people considered it as secondary) why PNV's government broke
down and, although the formation «of necessity» of government coalitions with
the PSOE, X. Arzallus has always been more prepared in order to pact with the
PP than with the PSOE, although they share one section (not very important but
significative) of the potential electorate, and even though the PP is next to it in the
three capitals of the ACBC10. The words of A. Pastor11 are very significative:
The PNV is ansioux about the promotion of the PP in Bilbao... Bilbao has
been a «fief» of the PNV... but in this country things are complicated, as it exists
terrorism and the threats to every option which is not nationalist involve curbing
natural leaders' facing... Y think that the PNV has had a lot of borrowed votes
from people who were not nationalist and that they used to think about the
transition: «let us vote for PNV, that, after all, they are on the right and they are a
party from here».
With regard to IU in the Basque Country, we should highlight just that in the
last elections it is more in relation to sections of voters coming from the PSE-EE
and other critics with the nationalism on the left than with a settlement of its
political space. The discourse of IU, with regard to some aspects of the estatutary
development and criterias for pacification, coincides with the nationalist proposals
(selfdetermination12, prisoners, etc.). But on the other hand, the radicality that
falls off from nationalism and the hiding and fading away by this of the ideological
vector which is left-right, and the internal conflicts that have been held as well,
determines and impedes a constant expansion of its project, standing subjected
to the moment oscillations of the basque political life.
Table1
Table2
Table3
Table4
Table5
Table6
NOTES
1. Historical Jurisdiction: Territorios Históricos.
2. Historical Jurisdiction Law: Ley de Territorios Históricos (LTH).
3. Provincial Goverment: Diputación Foral.
4. This article begins with an ingushian proverb that does not show the spirit of the ethic of responsability:
«Those who think about consequences cannot be valiant».
5. «Nothing classifies more to one than his own classifications», «saying with authority is doing» (Bourdieu).
6. J. Juaristi criticized the use of those analitic elements  by the PSOE in public, when he understood that it
had been banalized extremely and that it had broke with the spirit of that formulation.
7. In the same place where Arzalluz had adressed another breaking-off talk with the «Spirit of the Arriaga»
before. R. Jáuregui was harshly criticized and even discredited with allusions as «that he did not know enough
Euskera», «that it was an insult to the Euskera and euskladunes», etc., etc., which involved that some
members of the PSE thought that the nationalists annoyed that «non-nationalists» used the Euskera, because
they really thought that it was their heritage and, besides, they could not accept that there were also basques
who were «non-nationalists».
8. It is elucidating the outline of T. Montero (ancient member of HB) about the changes that have been held
in the PP: «...maybe because of an excess idelogization, the changes that are being held in this country are
not always valued as they should be valued... Y also spoke to the representant of the PP. The office in which
Y was received was decorated with an «ikurriña» which was as big as the spanish flag and there was a
councillor of not much more than 20 years old with a look of unsubmissive, who spoke a very worthy Euskera.
Better than mine. Those who go on thinking that this is just a political make-up are keeping out of sight the
realiy of those deep social and political changes... a change on the spanish right which is not trivial: accepting
all these symbols by political (formaciones) that have mainly stand out in an almost religious cult to the
spanish national system of symbols, it is something significant.
9. This «Third Project of Basque Autonomy» (after the project of autonomic construction and the project of
pacification and normalization of Ajuria Enea) is concrted on the following:
1st. Focusing on the contents (quality of teaching, real problems, etc.) and not on the frameworks and
continents (teaching  models, territorial dimension, etc.).
2nd. Focusing on the real problems and not on abstract, theoretical and ethereal discourses.
3rd. Reforming Basque Public Administration: reducing it, simplifying it, and rationalizing it.
4th. Giving a new projection to the basque out from the Community and a bigger influence, mainly in  the
economic and industrial policy of Spain.
5th. Revitalizing autonomy and recouping the role of the Basque Parliament.
6th. Generating a political climate based on the estability, the certainty and the desdramatization.
10. The PP is the first local political force en San Sebastián, and the second one in Bilbao and Vitoria in a
short-distance (10,000 votes) from the PNV.
11. Deputy Major in the city council of Bilbao, which is a symbolically key city for the PNV, where this party
has won all the elections in the democratic period (1197: 18).
12. Cfr. with «Towards the federalization of the State». Cap. 4, p. 221-231. Programa marco. General
elections, March 1996.
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Abertzale left: (Patriotic left) MLNV selfdenomination.
Ardanza, J.A.: PNV’s President (Lehendakari) of the Basc Government during the last three terms.
Arriaga: Bilbao’s theatre where some of the most important acts of the PNV’s cycle 2,000 Nationalism   have
been holden, one of them, the conference read by Xavier Arzallus, President of the Euskadi Buru Batzar.
Atutxa, J.M.: Interior Minister of the Basc Government.
Aula de Cultura de El Correo: (Culture lecture hall of El Correo) Series of cultural events organiced by El
Correo newspaper, the most read in the CAV.
Basquism: Recognition of the identity differential signs of the Basque Country. It implies the attempt to
develop such differencied signs. Its recognition does not implie having nationalist ideology.
Batzoki: Meeting and social club for PNV activists and supporters.
CAV: The three Basque provinces recognize in the Autonomous Statute.
Countrysale and hispanicism: To adopt anti-Basque positions, in general, or to appear as betrayers to the
basque cause from the perception of the nationalists and, more often, of the MLNV.
Democratic alternative: ETA minimum bases to stop their violent actions.
EA: Eusko Alkartasuna: (Basque Solidarity). Party lead by C. Garaikoetxea.
EE: Euskadiko Ezquerra: (Basque Left) party integrarted in the PNV. General Secretary R. Jáuregui.
Egibar, J.: Euskadi Buru Batzar spokesman. The EBB is the main representative organ of the PNV.
EITB (Euskal Irrati Telebista): Basque radio and television: Main organism of the Basque public radio and
television channels.
ELA: Euskal Langileen Alkartasuna: (Common cause of Basque workers) General Secretary J. Elorrieta.
Elkarri: Organization for Basque Country peace process. General Coordinator J. Fernández.
Elkarri’s conference for peace: Meetings lead by Elkarri’s organization in which only PSE-EE and PP did
not participate.
Ertzaintza: Autonomous Basque police.
ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna: (Basque Country and freedom). Terrorist organization which is part of the
MLNV.
EuE: Euskal Ezquerra: (Basque Left). Party born from a splitting of Euskadiko Ezkerra and lately united to
Eusko Alkartasuna. Nowadays some of its most important members are in the PNV.
Euskera: Basque language and process of basque language recuperation.
Euskobarómetro: Investigation team in the Department of Political Science and Administration of the Basque
Country University.
Galtzaundi: Cultural forum in Tolosa (Guipúzcoa) which organize conferences.
Garaikoetxea, C.: EA’s President and former PNV’s Lehendakari of the Basque Government.
HB: Herri Batasuna: (Popular Unity). Political coalition that articulates the MLNV colectives. It is a legal
organization.
Historical Jurisdiction and LTH: Each one of the three provinces which constitute the CAV. The LTH is the
law that concerns the three provinces granting to them a high level of fiscal autonomy, etc.
ICV: Iniciativa Ciudadana Vasca: (Basque Citizen Iniciative) Organization splitted from the PNV. It is
promoted by the Bilbao’s former major, J.M. Gorordo, and some personalities of the Vizcaya province. ICV is
established exclusively in Bilbao and the Vizcayan area.
IU-EB: Izquierda Unida-Euskal Berdeak: Coalition between Unit Left and the ecologist. General Secretary,
J. Madrazo.
Jáuregui, R.: General Secretary of PSE-EE. At the present he is Minister of Justice, Economic and Labour of
the Basque Government.
Kale borroka: (Street fighting). Desestabilization strategy designed by the MLNV. It consists in the
intensification of public disorders and all kind of attacks on people, institutions and goods that do not agree
with the MLNV positions.
KAS: Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista: (Patriot Socialist Coordinator) It is the organism that coordinates
the theory and tactics of the MLNV. ETA is a part of it.
KAS Alternative: Former alternative proposed by ETA.
LAB: Langile Abertzaleen Batzordea: (Patriot Workers Assembly) Labor union part of the MLNV and KAS.
General Secretary R. Díez.
Left Side: Industrial area formed by several towns beside Bilbao. Its population is mainly immigrants arrived
to the Basque Country.
Lehendakari: President of the Basque Autonomous Community.
Mayor Oreja, J.: Former Popular Party President of the Basque Country, Minister of the Interior of the
Spanish Government.
MLNV: Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco: Movement of Basque National Liberation. Contents all
the parties framwork, trends, etc. who are found arround ETA and HB.
Oldartzen: (Attacking, beating, harshly determining) Repot passed by HB. The MLNV has been carrying it out
in the last years.
Ollora, J.M.: Member of the PNV’s Euskadi Buru Batzar. Together with Egibar he is the forerunner of a new
PNV’s strategy on peace process and territorial definition of the Basque Country.
Onaindía, M.: PSE-EE leader, former General Secretary of the extinguish Euskadiko Eskerra. He is with
Jáuregui one of the forerunners of the Postnationalist thought and a change in the image of PSE-EE to
basquism.
Pact of Ajuria Enea: (Ajuria-Enea’s agreement) Strategic design for the pacifiaction of the Basque Country
through an agreement of all the politic forces except HB.
PNV: Partido Nacionalista Vasco: (Nationalist Basque Party) President of the Euskadi Buru Batzar: Xavier
Arzallus.
Postnationalism: Theory that holds the end of the nationalism due to changes in socio-cultural relations, etc.
PP: Partido Popular: Popular Party of the Basque Country. President C. Iturgaitz.
PSE-EE: Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra: (Socialist Party of Euskadi-Left of Basque
country) Party created by the union of the old PSOE and EE. General Secretary: R. Jáuregui.
Strength accumulation: Tactical process carried on by the MLNV to get close and to assimilate into its logic
of radical nationalism other organizations which hold sectorial conflicts in other fields of social, political,
cultural and economic life in the Basc Country.
Suffering socialization: Slogan of the MLNV, according which if the prisoners and their families and in
general the organizations of the MLNV hold the suffering imposed by the violence of the State, the same
suffering has to be holden by all those who were againts the MLNV.
Third space: Elkarri’s postulates to situate itself in a middle position between ETA and the MLNV, on one
hand, and the democratic politic forces, on the other.
UA: Unidad Alavesa: (Alavese Unity) Arising party born form a splitting of the PP organization in Alava.
General Secretary: Mosquera.
Viloria J.C.: Political correspondent of El Correo  newspaper and one of the experts in the basque politic
reality.
